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“Again and again Blackfeet warriors fleeing northward after a raiding attack 
watched with growing amazement as the pursuing troops of the United State 
Army came to a sudden, almost magical stop. Again and again, fleeing 
southward, they saw the same thing happen as the Canadian Mounties reined 
to an abrupt halt. The tribes of the Blackfeet Confederacy living along what 
is now the United States-Canadian border came to refer to that potent but 
invisible demarcation as the ‘Medicine Line.’ It seemed to them almost a 
supernatural manifestation.”1
border-crossing protocol that would, for 
example, accept tribal ID cards in lieu 
of passports. Although under the new 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 
(WHTI) the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) has agreed to temporarily 
accept tribal ID cards, conflicts continue 
over what tribes would need to do in 
order to create the “enhanced” tribal 
ID cards that DHS will be requiring in 
June 2009, and where the funding for 
such measures will come from (DHS 
2008, Thompson 2008). Similar ID 
cards have been proposed for Canadian 
First Nations. Native people would 
also like to restrict physical searches of 
members who are crossing borders to 
participate in traditional ceremonies in 
order to avoid the de-sanctification of 
religious objects or regalia that occurs 
when objects are seen or handled by 
unauthorized people. In addition, tribes 
are demanding a greater role in DHS 
initiatives directed at counter-terrorism 
and emergency preparedness, including 
direct access to funding. Currently, 
Nearly two centuries later, borders 
between the U.S. and its neighbors to 
the north and south continue to be a 
source of consternation for indigenous 
people, although today, they offer 
fewer compensatory benefits.2 Instead, 
for the more than 40 tribes that 
live along or near the northern and 
southern borders of the U.S., as well 
as a comparable number of Canadian 
First Nations, tightened security 
around borders has meant increased 
difficulty in pursuing intertribal trade 
and exchange, greater obstacles to 
delivery of social and health services 
to tribal members who live across 
national borders and the attenuation 
of social and kinship networks. Perhaps 
most importantly, barriers to border 
mobility undercut efforts to keep alive 
or re-create cultural traditions and 
practices that native leaders claim are 
critically important to the identities 
and well-being of their members. In 
the U.S., tribes have responded by 
calling for the creation of a separate 
1 Sharon O’Brien, (1984), 
“The Medicine Line:  A 
Border Dividing Tribal 
Sovereignty, Economies and 
Families,” 53 Fordham 
Law Review, p. 315.
2 More than 260 miles of 
the U.S. international bor-
der is under the jurisdiction 
of Indian tribal govern-
ments (Tribal Amendments 
to Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, p. 4, 2004).
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DHS grants go almost entirely to states, 
who are supposed to share them with 
tribes, but according to the tribes, 
seldom do. This article focuses upon the 
special problems that recent changes in 
border policy pose to American Indian 
Tribes and Canadian First Nations and 
evaluates arguments for and against the 
creation of special border protocols for 
native peoples. 
The case of border policy and native 
people presents interesting challenges 
for policy makers and social theorists. 
Post 9/11, federal, state and local 
governments have embarked on 
ambitious efforts to strengthen national 
security, and this has occasioned 
significant hardening of borders. 
Whether the strategy adopted by the 
U.S. government and its allies to respond 
to security threats has, on balance, been 
successful, will continue to be debated 
for some time. For the sake of argument, 
we will make the assumption that U.S. 
residents potentially benefit from 
efforts to increase domestic security. 
At the same time, we must note that 
border policy measures generate costs 
such as increased inconvenience, delays 
at border crossing points, dampening of 
trade, etc. (Globerman and Storer 2006). 
We will assume, once again for the sake 
of argument, that the aggregate benefits 
of recent border security policy changes 
outweigh their costs. Somewhat less 
controversially, we suggest that in 
creating policies and procedures 
aimed at increasing border security, 
governments should aim to treat all 
groups under the same set of rules and 
procedures unless there is a compelling 
reason to treat them differently. This 
reflects a widely-shared belief that good 
governance requires government to 
treat groups impartially or with equal 
concern.
 Whatever benefits are to be had from 
tightened border security take the form 
of a public good—once available to one, 
they are available to all. Perhaps more 
importantly in this context, their value 
is roughly equal for everyone, since 
anyone could conceivably be the victim 
of a terrorist attack. The same cannot 
be said of the costs of various efforts 
to increase border security. Some sorts 
of businesses, those dealing in imports 
and exports in North America, for 
example, could be expected to feel the 
costs of such policies more keenly, as 
could frequent travelers. And obviously 
border regions are most directly 
affected by changes in protocols for 
border crossing. As a general rule, is 
government obliged to make special 
allowances to take account of the 
distribution of costs in implementing 
policies? Unless costs are quite large, 
the answer would seem to be “no,” 
with the implicit justification that: (1) 
in a well-governed polity, some sort of 
rough justice emerges over time and 
across different policy areas, as groups 
who are “losers” in one area emerge as 
“winners” in another; and (2), attempts 
to fine-tune policies with respect to 
3
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their differential costs and benefits run 
a significant risk of favoring one group 
over another, or at least of creating a 
public perception that fundamental 
tenets of impartiality are being violated. 
 All of this would seem to argue 
against the position Tribes/First Nations 
have taken in demanding special 
consideration in border policy. Yet 
there are also arguments supporting the 
tribal perspective. For example, in some 
cases, when asymmetries are very large 
or where the circumstances of different 
groups are markedly dissimilar, we do 
treat different groups differently, and to 
do otherwise would strike many people 
as manifestly unfair. Sometimes it might 
even be said that equal concern requires 
differential treatment, such as when 
public health care dollars are channeled 
to patients undergoing dialysis 
treatment, rather than being doled 
out on some other basis—one person/
one share, for example. The question 
then becomes, when are asymmetries 
great enough to allow or even require 
that governments treat different 
groups differently? Do the impacts on 
tribes in the case of border policy rise 
to that level? What, if any, additional 
questions should we be asking in 
determining when differences between 
groups should make a difference in the 
way policies are crafted and carried out? 
Developing a full-fledged theory of 
when and why differential treatment 
is deserved or even required—one that 
could stand up against really difficult 
cases—is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Nor does the paper dwell on the legal 
reasoning that has led tribes to argue 
that under treaty law they are entitled 
to the right to freely cross borders, 
trade with other aboriginal people, be 
exempted from import/export taxes, 
and in other ways be subject to fewer 
restrictions than are people who are not 
the descendents of native treaty signers. 
A number of law review articles address 
these issues (O’Brien 1984, Castella 
2000, Osburn 2000, Lepsch 2002, 
Luna-Firebaugh 2005, Tonra 2006, Di 
Iorio 2007). My goals for this paper are 
different, and somewhat more modest. 
By presenting a series of representative 
cases depicting the problems faced by 
tribes, my intention is to elucidate some 
sorts of asymmetries in the distribution 
of costs and benefits associated with 
efforts to seek greater security through 
the hardening of border policies. In 
addition, I attempt to draw from, and 
apply, insights from recent academic 
discussions about multiculturalism, 
and how governments should proceed 
in recognizing and responding to 
the needs of cultural minorities in 
policy making. Hopefully, this will 
lead to some rudimentary conclusions 
about the effects of border policies on 
indigenous people, while at the same 
time contributing in some way to a 
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ALONG THE U.S./MEXICO 
BORDER 
For the many tribes/bands living in 
and around what are now considered 
the borderlands of the U.S. and Mexico, 
the establishment of a boundary that 
cut through native lands threatened to 
utterly transform social relations and 
kinship networks, subsistence patterns 
and cultural and religious practices.3 
Productive resources are spread thinly 
and unevenly in the arid southwest, 
and for native people, migration over 
large territories was a necessary and 
time-honored way of life. Migration 
was in some sense intrinsic to native 
culture. And until recently, the needs of 
members of the Yaqui, the Kumeyaay, 
the Cocopah Nation and other tribes 
living along what is now the U.S./
Mexico border were accorded some 
deference by federal border protection 
agencies. Often, the usual border-
crossing protocols were simply waived 
for native people—the Tohono O’odham 
had a number of unofficial crossing 
places spread throughout their 75-
mile border with Mexico, for example, 
and these were rarely even monitored. 
In other cases, regular cross border 
migration of certain tribes was officially 
recognized and sanctioned. The Texas 
Band of Kickapoo, for example, has 
both Mexican and U.S. members and 
has for decades lived in Nacimiento, 
Mexico, during the winter and traveled 
to Eagle Pass, Texas, to work as migrant 
farm hands for the rest of the year. In 
1983, Congress passed the Texas Band 
of Kickapoo Act, which ensured that 
Kickapoo could freely cross the border 
into Mexico and return at will. 
Many tribes had hoped they might 
be able to make similar political 
arrangements. Yet growing concerns 
about drug trafficking, about 
undocumented immigrants and, post-
9/11, fears about terrorism have resulted 
in a growing inflexibility on the part of 
the federal government. The situation 
of the Tohono O’odham Nation is 
perhaps the most vivid example of the 
negative, albeit largely unintended, 
consequences of recent government 
efforts toward greater border security.
TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION 
In 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo established the boundary line 
between the U.S. and Mexico at the Gila 
River, which meant that the territories 
of the people known as the Tohono 
O’odham became part of Mexico. 
Five years later, the Gadsden Purchase 
established the southern boundary 
of the United States at its present 
location, and in so doing, bisected 
the territory of the Tohono O’odham. 
Today, the reservation is comprised 
of 2.8 million acres (about the size of 
Connecticut), abutting 75 miles of the 
Mexican border, and reaches across the 
border into northern Sonora, Mexico. 
The Tohono O’odham Nation has 
about 27,000 members, more than 
a thousand of whom live across the 
border in Mexico. About half of the 
3 Between Texas and 
California, there are eight 
tribes with communities 
on both sides of the bor-
der: Kumeyaay, Cocopah, 
Tohono O’odham, Yaqui, 
Gila River Pima, Yavapai, 
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remaining tribal members live on the 
reservation. For the Tohono O’odham, 
the Yaqui and other native people of 
the region, the freedom to travel the 
many paths criss-crossing the border 
has always been essential—to gather 
medicinal plants, to collect a type of 
clay used at childbirth, or to practice 
the annual round of ceremonies that 
sustain the traditional religion and 
culture. While at the time of treaties 
the Tohono O’odham were not granted 
dual citizenship nor given explicit 
permission to move freely across the 
border, cross-border travel for work, 
for socializing and for participation in 
religious ceremonies was an established 
and accepted practice for more than a 
century. In the mid-1980s that began to 
change, and by the mid-1990s, it began 
to change dramatically. 
Today, parts of the formerly quiet, 
isolated reservation have been 
transformed into an area bristling 
with weapons, new roads, spotlights 
and military surveillance vehicles. 
Beginning in the 1990s, a series of 
strategic decisions were made by federal 
agencies to clamp down on illegal entry 
at popular border crossing points—
beginning in San Diego, California, with 
“Operation Gatekeeper” (1994), later 
spreading eastward with “Operation 
Safeguard” (1995) in central Arizona, 
and then “Operation Rio Grande” in 
the southernmost tip of Texas in 1998.4 
Various reasons have been suggested 
for these successive waves of intense 
border security—to displace drug 
and human-trafficking from densely 
populated areas to less visible locations 
and to change behavior of would-
be crossers by re-channeling activity 
to areas with highly inhospitable 
conditions. The resulting “funnel 
effect” relocated vast amounts of illegal 
border-crossing activity to the Tohono 
Tohono O’odham reservation is shown in southern Arizona. Map Courtesy of EPA. 
4 Between 1994 and 1997, 
the budget for the Depart-
ment of Immigration and 
Naturalization Services 
doubled, the number of 
Border Patrol agents nearly 
doubled and the amount of 
fencing more than doubled. 
We do not have precise 
figures on the number of 
miles of additional roads 
or high illumination 
floodlights that have been 
installed since then.  
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O’odham reservation, where summer 
temperatures have been known to reach 
130 degrees, water is scarce and the 
terrain difficult. The costs to the Tohono 
O’odham have been significant. 
Testifying at congressional hearings 
in 2003, then-Chairwoman Vivian 
Juan-Saunders reported that in 2002 
and 2003 nearly 1,500 undocumented 
immigrants were crossing reservation 
lands every day.5 The figures are roughly 
the same today. More than 60 bodies 
are recovered every year (McCombs 
2007). The reservation is second only 
to Nogales, Arizona, in terms of the 
quantities of drugs being smuggled 
across the U.S./Mexico border. Residents 
report that their homes are broken into 
by desperate migrants in search of food, 
water, or money. Many also complain 
of conflicts with Border Patrol officers. 
Some Tohono O’odham members have 
themselves been seduced into smuggling 
of either drugs or immigrants, which, 
given an official unemployment rate 
of 42 percent and a per capita income 
of only $8,000 per year, is hardly 
surprising.6  The 71-member Tohono 
O’odham police force spends more 
than half of its time chasing traffickers, 
recovering abandoned cars, cleaning up 
trash and rescuing ill-fated immigrants 
or recovering their remains. Every year 
the tribe and the Indian Public Health 
service spends nearly $7 million on a 
combination of law enforcement, health 
care and related services (Dougherty 
2007, Lewin 2005). 
The tribe, which in the past had 
resisted efforts of the Border Patrol 
to establish itself on the reservation, 
is internally divided on how best to 
respond to the myriad problems it 
is currently facing involving border 
issues. The tribal leadership has invited 
the Border Patrol and other federal 
law enforcement to assist in stemming 
the flow of drugs and undocumented 
immigrants and has approved the 
construction of permanent Border 
Patrol facilities on Tohono O’odham 
land. Yet while the tribe has supported 
the construction of a barrier to vehicles 
along its border, Tribal Chairman Ned 
Norris has gone on record as opposing 
the sort of heavily-fortified wall that he 
claims is currently being planned by 
DHS under the “Secure Border Fence 
Act of 2007” (McCombs 2007). 
In addition, tribal officials complain 
that DHS rarely consults with them and 
that tribes are not being reimbursed 
for expenditures made in response to 
border problems. The tribe contends 
that DHS has ignored the “government 
to government” relationship that 
federal agencies are required by law 
to adopt toward tribes and has been 
fundamentally unresponsive to the 
needs of the Tohono O’odham for 
additional funding, or with respect to 
planning or implementation of border 
security initiatives. Tribal Chairwoman 
Vivian Juan-Saunders testified before 
Congress in 2003 in support of legislation 
that would have allowed greater tribal 
5 Testimony of Vivian 
Juan-Saunders, Chairper-
son, Tohono O’odham Na-
tion of Arizona in Hearing 
before the Committee on 
Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, 
concerning Tribal Govern-
ment Amendments to the 
Homeland Security Act of 
2002. July 30, 2003. 
6 In 2006, average per cap-
ita income in the United 
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participation in planning and increased 
funding of tribal initiatives under the 
DHS, but to no avail.   
While increased trafficking of humans 
and drugs across reservation borders has 
caused a variety of environmental and 
security problems, as well as shortfalls 
in resources for law enforcement and 
medical treatment, many Tohono 
O’odham consider the larger problem 
to be the omnipresence of Border Patrol 
and other federal law enforcement 
agents. Some are said to fear the Border 
Patrol and DEA agents as much as, 
if not more than, than they do the 
undocumented immigrants. The Border 
Patrol has been taking increasingly 
aggressive measures to curtail 
smuggling, and tribal members report 
being met with spotlights at night 
in their own backyards and having 
officers walk into homes unannounced 
to interrogate people in the middle of 
the night. Cars and their occupants are 
routinely searched. Caught between 
smugglers and edgy Border Patrol 
agents, many people are said to be 
afraid to leave their homes, especially 
at night. For groups such as Alianza 
Indigina Sin Fronteras (Indigenous 
Alliance Without Borders), the situation 
on the Tohono O’odham reservation 
simply demonstrates, in a particularly 
dramatic fashion, what they see as the 
moral bankruptcy of recent border-
tightening initiatives. Members of the 
organization express a sense of kinship 
with undocumented migrants, many of 
whom are indigenous themselves, who 
risk their lives for an opportunity to take 
low-wage work in the U.S. Despite the 
fact that the Tohono O’odham recently 
passed a law making it a crime to shelter 
illegal immigrants, some tribal members 
have vowed to continue to put out 
water barrels for thirsty immigrants and 
to search for the bodies of those who 
die while making the attempt to cross 
(McCombs 2008).  
TRIBES ALONG THE CANADA/
U.S. BORDER  
Tribes that share a border with 
Canada include the Mohawk (New York 
and Ontario and Quebec), Blackfeet 
(Alberta and Montana), Red Lake Band 
of Chippewa (Minnesota and Canada), 
Aroostook Band of Micmac (Maine and 
New Brunswick) and Houlton Band 
Maliseet (Maine and New Brunswick).7 
Other tribes, such as the Lummi, 
or Sto’lo, or any of the dozens of 
Coast Salish tribes/bands of Western 
Washington and British Columbia, are 
close to, but not directly on the border. 
Nonetheless, the cultural and social 
links between them are important, 
and current border policy threatens to 
undermine these relationships.  
THE MOHAWK TRIBE 
The boundaries that bisected the 
Mohawk’s traditional territory were 
fixed by the 1783 Treaty of Paris. A 
dozen years later, Mohawk bands on 
the U.S. side of the border ceded most 
of their lands to the State of New York, 7 Lepsch, Peter D. 2003.
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and took up residence on the current 
14,000-acre reservation around the 
village of St. Regis. On the Canadian 
side, which borders the provinces of 
Ontario and Quebec, as well as New 
York State, about 12,000 Mohawks live 
on a reserve of 24,000 acres (O’Brien 
1984). Mohawks are governed by the St. 
Regis Tribal Council, which governs the 
American side, the Mohawk Council 
of Akwesasne, which governs the 
Canadian side, and a parallel system 
of traditional chiefs on both sides, 
who lack formal governing powers 
but retain considerable influence. In 
addition, Mohawks must deal with 
both the Canadian and U.S. federal 
governments and their respective 
state and/or provincial governments. 
Planning, economic development 
projects, and even the delivery of social 
services is complicated by the network 
of governments. Widespread poverty 
on the reservation, in combination 
with the reservation’s strategic location 
along the St. Lawrence Seaway, make 
smuggling an extremely attractive 
proposition to many tribal members. 
Even the tribal chairman admits that 
smuggling has been a way of life for the 
Mohawk reaching back to the days of Al 
Capone. Today, it seems to be reaching 
epidemic proportions. 
There are 6,000 tribal members on the 
U.S. side of the Mohawk reservation, 
and federal investigators estimate that 
the reservation hosts 10-15 major 
Indian crime organizations, moving 
about $1 billion of drugs across the 
border annually (Kershaw 2006). Many 
tribal members themselves are heavily 
involved with the drug trade—as users, 
as “mules,” and increasingly, as large-
scale dealers. Illegal immigrants are also 
being trafficked through the St. Regis 
reservation. The Mohawk Tribe has an 
agreement with federal and state officials 
that prohibits police from patrolling the 
river’s shoreline and the many islands 
that lie within tribal territory. Especially 
during the winter, when the river freezes 
and can be crossed (with difficulty) over 
the ice, the area becomes what one New 
York newspaper called an “express lane” 
for smuggling drugs, cigarettes, people 
or anything else that yields a profit 
(N.Y. Post, 2008). Despite spending 
more than half of its revenues from 
casinos and other tribal businesses—
about $2 million in all—on border 
patrol and other law enforcement every 
year, the tribal police resources are 
clearly out-matched. There are some 
indications that corruption within 
tribal government has contributed to 
the inability to stem the tide of drugs 
and violence. To be sure, there are also 
instances of successful cooperation 
between tribal and non-tribal law 
enforcement agencies.8 Yet all in all, it 
would be difficult to dismiss the very 
real concerns law enforcement officials 
have about current safeguards against 
terrorism, drug smuggling and human 
trafficking within the portion of the 
Canada/U.S. border that lies within the 
Mohawk Nation. 
8 One recent example 
of cooperative policing 
involved 300 law enforce-
ment agents, including 
Mohawk Peacekeepers from 
the Kahnawake, Kane-
satake and Akwesasne 
communities in Quebec, 
Ontario and New York; 
the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency; the Royal Cana-
dian Mounted Police and 
provincial police in Quebec 
and Ontario. Fifteen raids 
resulted in 30 arrests and 
the confiscation of drugs, 
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PACIFIC NORTHWEST TRIBES 
In the summer of 2007, the Lummi 
Nation, a Western Washington tribe 
of about 4,000 people living on a 
37-square mile reservation, hosted a 
weeklong-event entitled “Paddle-to-
Lummi.” The overarching purpose of 
the gathering was cultural renewal of 
the traditional ties between the many 
Coastal Salish peoples living along the 
Georgia Basin/Puget Sound shoreline on 
either side of the Canada/U.S. border, of 
the traditional mode of transportation 
via large, sea-going canoes, and of 
traditional practices such as the 
potlatch. Potlatches, which include 
feasts and gift-giving by the ceremonial 
host, were once integral to the social 
system and ordered hierarchy of the 
Coast Salish. The “Paddle-to-Lummi” 
event marked the first potlatch since 
1937, and 73 canoes and hundreds of 
paddlers made the journey, some from 
as far as 400 miles to the north. About 
12,000 friends, family and curious 
spectators made the trip via more 
conventional means of transportation. 
In order for the event to take place, 
thousands of people needed to cross 
the Canada/U.S. border, some through 
shared marine waters. Initially, the task 
of facilitating the border crossings of so 
many people, including children and 
others who lacked required documents, 
looked almost insurmountable to 
organizers. Fortunately, U.S. Customs 
and Border Patrol officials were willing 
to issue group permits for the canoe 
paddlers. Still, many who otherwise 
would have attended may have been 
deterred because of fears that recent 
border “hardening” would expose 
them to unwanted scrutiny or prevent 
their entry entirely. The problems that 
presented themselves for the organizers 
of the event are typical of the sorts 
of obstacles to cultural preservation 
posed by tightened border security. 
For example, it is an ongoing source of 
tension for traditional tribal members 
that religious objects or spiritual regalia 
that are being taken across borders for 
use in ceremonial gatherings are subject 
to border searches.   
Cultural renewal is a priority goal 
for the Lummi leadership, as it is 
for many tribes and First Nations. Native 
leaders believe that the restoration 
of cultural traditions is key to 
addressing problems endemic to many 
indigenous communities—alcoholism, 
drug addiction and the array of problems 
left in their wake. The Lummi and 
other area tribes have created a variety 
of initiatives aimed at re-connecting 
with their “relatives” to the north. 
These include pow-wows, religious 
ceremonies and “gatherings” aimed at 
monitoring the environmental threats 
that threaten the remaining vestiges of 
a traditional way of life.
It is obvious why the Lummi and 
other tribes would prefer a system for 
border crossing that would allow tribal 
members to use identification cards 
issued by their own tribal governments 
10
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instead of passports. Some tribal 
members (although their numbers 
diminish every year) do not have 
birth certificates. There is considerable 
suspicion of government in many 
indigenous communities. For example, 
the practice of removing Indian children 
from their families and placing them 
in residential schools where they were 
often beaten, shamed and mistreated, 
is still alive in the memories of older 
Indians on both sides of the Canada/
U.S. border. Many native people are 
simply uneasy about placing themselves 
in a situation where their lives are open 
to government scrutiny. Others fear 
that their applications will fail because 
of previous entanglements with legal 
authorities—from DUI charges to failure 
to pay child support. Canada Border 
Services Agency agents have been 
known to prevent entry for those who 
have been convicted of such offenses. 
Either individually or in combination, 
these factors dissuade people from 
crossing the Canada/U.S. border, even to 
attend a relative’s funeral or participate 
in a ceremony. In this way, familial and 
cultural connections are attenuated and 
become less meaningful. 
Recently DHS has given ground 
on the issue of cross-border travel 
documents. Under the newly-enacted 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 
(WHTI), all travelers to and from 
Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean and 
Bermuda must present a passport or 
other WHTI-compliant document (DHS 
2008). DHS has agreed to allow tribes to 
create “enhanced” tribal ID cards that 
can be used in lieu of passports. Yet the 
cost of creating the card system, which, 
under DHS regulations, would require 
a computer system that would allow 
immediate electronic verification at 
ports of entry, will prohibit most tribes 
from exercising this option (Thompson 
2008). So far, no federal or state funds 
have been earmarked for this purpose.  
Despite the costs imposed on 
indigenous populations by recent 
security policy, the concerns of federal 
agents with respect to the threats posed 
by drug smuggling, human trafficking 
and terrorism are not without 
foundation. Like the Mohawk and 
many other U.S. tribes, the Lummi 
Nation struggles to control drug 
smuggling. A booming reservation 
trade in OxyContin was worth $1.5 
million in 2003, more than double the 
profits from the tribe’s new casino (NYT 
2006). According to one convicted drug 
dealer, it is common in the course of 
transporting drugs across the border 
to hide drugs in objects that are then 
claimed to be materials associated 
with religious practices. Smugglers 
are obviously attempting to take 
advantage of the fact that customs 
inspectors have been roundly criticized 
for cultural insensitivity in the past, 
and have subsequently become more 
respectful (and perhaps less rigorous) in 
their inspection of sacred objects. The 
federally unrecognized Kaweah Indian 
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Nation is currently under investigation 
in several states for selling tribal 
identification cards to undocumented 
aliens after promising that the 
cards would protect the aliens from 




In the U.S., relations between federal 
agencies and Indian tribes are supposed 
to take place in the context of what is 
called a “government-to-government 
relationship.” Essentially, this means 
that planning, implementation and 
funding of federal programs occurs 
through a collaborative process between 
a given tribe and the federal agency(ies). 
The relationship between the federal 
government and tribes is supposed to 
be direct—tribes are similar to states 
in that respect, and very different 
from local governments, who are 
subservient to state governments, and 
must rely on them for funding. In 2000, 
Executive Order 13175 formalized this 
relationship and made consultation and 
coordination with tribal governments 
a requirement for all federal agencies 
(Federal Register 2001). Yet until quite 
recently, DHS’s record of consultation 
and cooperation with tribes has been 
“very bad,” according to Heather 
Thompson of the National Congress 
of Indian Tribes (Thompson 2008). 
Thompson attributes this to the new 
agency’s lack of historical relationships 
with tribes, as well as to the fact that 
DHS does not have a formal institutional 
structure for tribal consultation or even 
a permanent Native American policy 
staff position.  
The lack of direct DHS funding-
programs for building tribal capacities in 
law enforcement and domestic security 
is a very serious ongoing problem. 
Nearly all DHS grant funding goes to 
states, and tribes are forced to compete 
with local governments for the resources 
they need to maintain border security. 
In 2003, legislation was introduced that 
would have acknowledged the distinct 
status of tribes and would have made 
them eligible to compete for federal 
funding associated with homeland 
security initiatives, but it failed to make 
it out of committee. During legislative 
hearings before the Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs, then-president of the 
National Congress of American Indians 
(NCAI) Tex Hall reported that his 
own reservation, Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation in North Dakota—the site 
of 18 Minuteman missile silos—received 
no funds from either DHS or the U.S. 
military. Hall added that in the previous 
year, the State of North Dakota received 
just over $13.2 million for homeland 
security, of which $73,000 was to go 
to tribes. And since that money was to 
be spent to hire a Homeland Security 
Liaison to work with Indian tribes, 
none of the funds were actually going 
to be spent on direct law enforcement 
or training of tribal personnel (U.S. 
Senate Hearings on Tribal Government 
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Amendments to Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, p. 47). 
During recent congressional 
negotiations over the allocation of 
DHS grant funds for the 2008 fiscal 
year, Congress established a very 
small program that tribes could apply 
to directly. But unlike similar (but 
much larger) state programs, funding 
mechanisms were implemented in such 
a way as to create a ceiling beyond which 
funds could not grow. The program 
also contains a series of restrictions 
that will prevent the majority of tribes 
from obtaining funding (Thompson 
2008). For the great bulk of federal 
grant money, tribes must still petition 
the states, which, in the context of 
internal conflicts over how to allocate 
scarce funds, have little reason to 
award money to tribes rather than local 
governments. Nor is the problem limited 
to funds for grants for infrastructure, 
law enforcement or capacity building. 
Under the rules governing the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), tribes suffering the effects of a 
natural disaster must appeal first to their 
state governments, which must then 
petition on their behalf before a disaster 
declaration can be made. The injury to 
tribes is two-fold: first, as the result of 
the history of land dispossession and 
subsequent reallocation, reservations 
are generally in poorer areas, which 
are often those most vulnerable to 
flooding, wildfires or other natural 
catastrophes; second, since states have 
little responsibility or taxation authority 
on Indian reservations, their incentives 
are fundamentally incompatible with 
the best interests of tribes.  
DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
At this point we return to the 
questions set out in the introduction. 
Now that we have some sense of current 
conditions facing a representative group 
of indigenous peoples living on or near 
areas where the U.S. borders Canada and 
Mexico, what should we conclude? Are 
tribes bearing an unfair portion of the 
costs of border security? If so, do such 
asymmetries justify the creation of a 
separate protocol for Native Americans 
and First Nations? Do current debates 
in the literature about multiculturalism 
provide useful guidance in this and 
similar dilemmas, where the interests 
of the minority populations and those 
of the general public appear to be in 
conflict?
First, a brief explanation of the 
positions taken in debates over how 
governments should accommodate the 
social reality of multiculturalism. The 
traditional, liberal position9 argues for 
individual rights and equal treatment 
of all citizens in the public sphere, 
and grants significant autonomy to 
individuals in their private lives and to 
the formation and internal workings 
of groups and communities, as long 
as these do not threaten individual 
rights or those of other groups and 
9 The term “liberal” in 
this context refers not to 
everyday usage of “liberal” 
and “conservative,” but 
rather to an ideology or set 
of principles upon which 
modern democracies have 
historically been premised. 
Individual freedom, a full 
complement of civil rights 
and political equality are 
among those values closely 
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communities. This set of arguments is 
consistent with the high value liberals 
place on freedom, but also, many would 
argue, represents the principles best 
suited to achieve mutual toleration in 
countries that are increasingly diverse—
ethnically, racially and culturally. 
Liberal egalitarians have generally 
envisioned this emancipatory project 
being accompanied by collective action 
aimed at bringing about conditions of 
greater social and economic equality 
(Barry 2001). 
Conversely, the multiculturalism 
model argues that simply protecting 
basic legal and political rights is 
insufficient—that in order to fulfill 
its obligation to demonstrate “equal 
concern” for all people, government 
must provide support for and in some 
sense endorse the distinct cultures 
of minority groups. In what to some 
people, at least, is its most persuasive 
version, the multiculturalist model is 
linked to freedom and autonomy. The 
basic argument is that freedom involves 
individuals making choices about the 
sort of lives they wish to lead, and that 
their ability to make meaningful choices 
presupposes an array of choices that 
arise from, and are made intelligible 
by, the societal culture within which 
one identifies (Kymlicka 1995). Thus it 
is governments’ obligation to provide 
some level of public recognition and 
support for minority cultures, and, 
in some circumstances, to waive 
certain legal requirement and/or grant 
categorical exceptions to policies that 
run counter to cultural practices and 
beliefs. 
Proponents of the multiculturalist 
position argue that failing to undertake 
such measures is both wrong (in the 
sense that it violates the obligations 
that governments have toward their 
citizens); and furthermore would 
likely lead to the continuing erasure of 
distinct minority cultures. Opponents 
claim that multiculturalist policies may 
exacerbate existing tensions between 
groups in society while at the same time 
misdirecting efforts away from the more 
important project of greater economic 
and social equality between all people 
(Barry 2001).10  
With that abbreviated background 
to the debate, we can now reconsider 
the cases. Several questions are being 
posed: is the securitization of borders 
resulting in disproportionate costs 
being imposed on indigenous people 
to an extent that governments are 
obligated to make changes in policy? 
And if policy changes are called for, 
then could appropriate policy changes 
be made within the current liberal 
framework of governance, e.g. a single 
set of laws applicable to everyone; or, 
as multiculturalists have argued in 
other cases, must government respond 
by creating a separate set of laws and 
regulations, in this case separate border 
protocols for indigenous people? 
Before tackling these questions, it may 
10 In addition to academic 
critics of multiculturalism, 
the latter criticism has 
been voiced by aboriginal 
leader Noel Pearson in 
Australia (Banting 2005). 
Attempts to empirically 
test the claim that mul-
ticulturalism undermines 
public support and gen-
erosity for welfare states 
have produced ambiguous 
results (Banting 2005). 
Yet casual observation—
through electronic blogs 
and letters to the editor 
in response to articles 
about “special” rights 
for indigenous people for 
border crossing and other 
activities— suggests there 
is considerable resentment 
of such policies, what are 
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be useful to divide the damages/costs 
experienced by indigenous people 
into two categories: those that we will 
call culture-neutral—costs that could 
be expected to be felt by any group of 
people in a similar situation; and what 
we will term culture-sensitive costs, by 
which we mean costs that are particular 
to a group’s culture and identity, or at 
least for which cultural identity could be 
expected to have the effect of increasing 
the injury. In the first instance, there 
is no need to rely on the arguments 
or prescriptions of multiculturalists, 
while in the case of culture-sensitive 
costs, there may be, although this is not 
necessarily the case.  
TOHONO O’ODHAM, A 
CASE OF LARGELY CULTURE-
NEUTRAL COSTS 
It seems clear that the Tohono 
O’odham are being saddled with a 
hugely disproportionate share of costs 
associated with efforts to safeguard 
society from terrorism and to reduce 
illegal activities associated with drugs 
and human trafficking. It is hard to 
see how this is fair or just, particularly 
when some of the worst aspects of 
the situation facing tribal members 
result from a deliberate effort to choke 
off trafficking in other areas of the 
country and funnel it into the Sonoran 
Desert, when the spillover effects of 
such a policy on local people were 
clearly predictable. The underlying 
structure of the Tohono O’odham case 
is analogous to the many situations 
termed “environmental (in)justice,” 
where industrial facilities, landfills, 
or other locally undesirable land uses 
(LULUs) are sited next to people who 
are poor, nonwhite, or both, with the 
result that relatively powerless people 
are exposed to toxic substances more 
frequently and more intensely than 
are affluent, relatively powerful people. 
With respect to environmental policies, 
U.S. federal requirements were changed 
in the early 1990s and now mandate 
that government officials consider 
the effects of projects and policies on 
minority or low-income populations. 
The same logic that resulted in such 
changes in policy should apply here. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how 
public policy that concentrates costs 
so heavily on any group of people, 
regardless of the cultural or ethnic 
identities, can withstand scrutiny. With 
respect to many of the problems faced 
by the Tohono O’odham—risks posed 
by high levels of criminal activity, 
sustained government surveillance, 
including frequent searches and other 
invasions of privacy, damage to the 
natural environment, and so on—
culturally specific arguments are not 
required since it is enough simply to 
look at basic tenants of good governance 
with respect to how burdens are (or 
should be) shared. 
CULTURE-SENSITIVE COSTS—A 
PLACE FOR MULTICULTURALIST 
POLICIES? 
Yet not all of the costs faced by the 
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officials might argue that the interests 
of tribes must be overridden by the 
even stronger interest the public has in 
domestic security. Much of the 260 miles 
of the international border that abuts 
Indian reservations has been shown to 
be quite porous, and the result has been 
a concentration of border-related illegal 
activity. Many Indian reservations are 
currently grappling with crime rates 
that are nearly double those on non-
Indian communities, with few obvious 
signs of success (Perry 2004). While 
no serious terrorism threats have been 
discovered on reservations, it seems 
likely that this is not because such 
threats have been thwarted, but rather 
that they have yet to be attempted. If 
we assume that discouraging terrorism 
and drug trafficking or diminishing the 
numbers of immigrants that enter the 
U.S. illegally are, either individually or 
in combination, necessary, important 
public policy goals, then it is not hard 
to see why the idea of relaxing border 
crossing requirements to accommodate 
tribal preferences strikes many people 
as irrational. This lack of confidence in 
the tribal law enforcement capacities is 
no doubt part of what lies behind DHS’s 
apparent usurpation of the tribal role in 
ensuring domestic security.
WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN 
DO: BUILDING CAPACITY AND 
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE 
TRIBAL ROLE    
Yet it is here that current government 
policy is most mistaken. As has been 
Tohono O’odham or other tribes fall 
into this category. Here the argument 
for differential treatment—for example, 
border protocols that would allow tribal 
members to travel freely (or at least with 
fewer encumbrances) across borders—
must rest on cultural arguments, 
e.g. the damage that will be done to 
tribal members, either individually 
or collectively, and tribal culture. For 
example, for a variety of reasons, 
native people may be more likely to 
encounter difficulties with meeting 
the requirements of border officials. In 
addition, many tribes are engaged in 
deliberate, concerted efforts to restore 
and revitalize cultural traditions as a key 
component in a larger effort to address 
the myriad social, health-related and 
other problems that are endemic to 
reservations. There is every reason to 
believe that such approaches are more 
likely to succeed than conventional 
methods. A large, longitudinal study 
comparing economic development 
levels on a number of Indian reservations 
concludes that the “closeness of 
fit” between traditional culture and 
political/economic institutions is a 
powerful influence on success (Cornell 
& Kalt, undated). Cultural renewal 
efforts are clearly being hampered by 
border controls that discourage people 
from crossing borders. For these reasons, 
tribes could contend that culture-
specific costs are sufficient to require 
exceptions be made. 
On the opposing side, government 
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demonstrated in locations all over 
the world, the maintenance of social 
order and law enforcement requires 
adequate funding—either internally or 
from higher levels of government—and 
support from the community. Failing to 
fund tribal law enforcement agencies 
and train tribal personnel in the 
implementation of homeland security 
initiatives and then using inadequate 
capacity as a reason to deny tribes’ own 
efforts to balance security with cultural 
needs clearly is a case of blaming the 
victim. A more reasonable, equitable 
and workable approach would first focus 
on compensating tribes for damages 
that have occurred as the unintended 
consequences of new border security 
regimes, and then on making significant 
investments in building tribes’ own 
capacities to respond to security threats, 
cross-border drug trade, etc. Rather 
than interpreting signs of inefficiency 
or inadequacy as a mandate to step in 
and take over, DHS should reflect on the 
failures of such efforts in the past and 
attempt to engage tribal communities. 
A variety of models are already 
functioning where responsibility for 
policy in a particular area is shared 
between federal and tribal governments. 
In fact, both the U.S. Department of 
Defense and the U.S. Department of 
Justice have institutionalized programs 
that create processes for collaboration 
and coordination with tribes. 
Many states have similar programs. 
There is solid evidence to indicate 
that heightened responsibility or 
sovereignty is a necessary condition of 
better performance and accountability 
on Indian reservations (Cornell and 
Kalt, undated). The justification for 
such initiatives does not require an 
endorsement of the entire package of 
multiculturalist arguments, although it 
would acknowledge that social identity 
and indigenous culture are important 
to people and worthy of protection by 
government. In this case, (although 
perhaps not in others) most of what 
I term culture-sensitive costs could be 
addressed without changing underlying 
assumptions about impartiality 
and equal treatment under the law. 
Government agencies could respect 
local autonomy and benefit from local 
knowledge by allowing tribes to devise, 
by whatever means they chose, a border 
security regime that would function 
in such a way as to meet national 
standards.   
A number of specific measures that 
could advance such an agenda have been 
endorsed by NCAI (Thompson 2008). 
First, DHS could come into compliance 
with current law by institutionalizing 
a process for consultation and 
coordination with tribal governments. 
This could conceivably require the 
creation of an office of tribal affairs and 
tribal policy, but in light of the size and 
scale of resources available to DHS, it 
is hard to see why this would not be 
feasible. At the same time, tribes could be 
better integrated into planning boards 
and advisory committees. Second, DHS 
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devolution has been the preferred 
approach for governments grappling 
with a host of difficult problems—
environmental, law enforcement, 
economic development—while the 
institutions and practices surrounding 
border policy have been cast in a 
rigid, antiquated, top-down structure. 
Such a model does have the effect of 
centralizing power, but at a high cost to 
efficiency, and, in this case, a high cost 
to peoples who are closest to the areas of 
impact. Whether there will be a change 
in the direction of a more equitable, 
effective set of policies seems far from 
certain, but without it, international 
borders abutting Indian reservations 
will continue to pose a security threat, 
and some of the most vulnerable people 
in the U.S. will continue to lose some of 
the remaining shards of their cultures.    
 
should formalize a government-to-
government relationship with tribes, 
which allows tribes to apply directly 
to DHS for grants that could be used 
for building tribal infrastructure 
and capacity. Given the incentive 
incompatibilities discussed above, 
neither states nor tribes are being well 
served by the current set of institutional 
arrangements. Law enforcement on 
Indian reservations will no doubt 
remain a sensitive issue for residents of 
many local communities and for their 
representatives in Congress, particularly 
when it involves tribal policing of non-
members, but the notion that such 
conflicts can be resolved by starving 
tribes of needed funds is untenable. 
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